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In August 1971 the UK government, following a request made from the devolved 
government of Northern Ireland, authorised the re-introduction of internment 
without trial for suspected members of Irish Republican paramilitary groups in 
Northern Ireland. This new work, based on the author’s PhD thesis at Queen’s 
University Belfast, studies in detail the planning, implementation and impact of this 
counter-terrorism policy over the four years in which it was in place and represents 
the first monograph-length academic study of this particular aspect of the early 
period of the Northern Ireland Troubles.  
McCleery’s historical account measures contemporary and more recent analyses, 
against both government and accepted nationalist myths and narratives by carefully 
gauging its arguments against the evidence in a revealing and skilful way. The work 
is strongest in its discussions of the debates surrounding the internment policy’s 
introduction, the use of intelligence to identify suspects for the various lists that 
were developed and in the use of ‘enhanced’ interrogation techniques. McCleery’s 
work is especially useful in demonstrating the limitations of received wisdom taken 
from the post-facto accounts given by both the internees and the interners clarifying 
that, for example, whilst internment was used almost entirely against Irish 
Republican organisations, its targeting of those organisations was ultimately fairly 
accurate. 
This work follows a recent trend for studies in the Northern Ireland Troubles toward 
narrower, local, or issue-based accounts. One might look to an originating point in 
these kinds of studies to Niall Ó Dochartaigh’s From Civil Rights to Armalites (1997)   
that focused on Derry (usefully extended through research by Warner and Prince in 
2011) though of late Henry Patterson’s work on the Irish border, Ireland’s Violent 
Frontier (2013) and Hennessey’s, Hunger Strike (2013), along with Tim Wilson’s 
comparative work Frontiers of Violence (2010) have all served to overthrow 
mythologies and the many local amnesias associated with issues in Northern 
Ireland’s troubled past. It is in this area that McCleery’s work makes its strongest 
contributions. Accounts of the impact of internment traditionally demonstrate that 
the policy caused an initial spike in violence with a new, higher plateau established 
shortly thereafter. This book goes into far greater detail than before to explore how 
internment radicalised and encouraged existing republican paramilitaries; 
paramilitaries that had previously been reluctant to press home a dedicated 
campaign of violence in their districts. Through the examples of increased violence 
caused by the radicalisation of actors as a result of the introduction of internment, 
McCleery demonstrates that it was in the provincial towns of Newry, Dungannon, 
Lurgan and Enniskillen where the escalation of violence occurred and where the 
wider guerrilla campaign of the later 1970s and 1980s emerged. This thesis, 
challenges other, more state-centric hypotheses that conclude that it was Operation 
Motorman (in August 1972) that forced the IRA into a conflict in the countryside and 
on the border (e.g. Smith and Neumann, 2005) and which ignore the propaganda 
effect a year earlier of using internment solely on the Catholic community. The 
radicalisation of rural Catholics in Northern Ireland did not lead to fully formed and 
competent IRA units appearing overnight (importantly McCleery accounts for the 
time lag) but there is no doubt from this research that the increasing efficacy of 
Republican attacks in these areas was not without want for trying between the 
summers of 1971 and 1972. Forensically examining relevant incidents in Chapter 5 
McCleery concludes: 
‘Just as the [earlier] Falls Road Curfew in Belfast and killings 
of Beattie and Cussack in Derry brought the conflict in those 
two cities onto a new plane, it was after the introduction of 
internment that similar levels of violence were to occur in the 
four provincial towns.’ (p.163)  
Curiously McCleery’s conclusions with regard to loyalists and internment are less 
well developed. He is correct to demonstrate that they were not considered a threat 
to the state, but this far from absolves the state from its responsibility to defend 
law and order and might have been critiqued further. Loyalists were, after all 
responsible for 588 deaths from 1971 to 1976 (Sutton, 2002) and, in the Ulster 
Workers Council Strike of May 1974 played a large part in bringing down the 
promising power sharing agreement between constitutional nationalists and 
unionists.    
Another area of weakness in this work lies in the limitations of its research to 
printed and archival sources. Although four interviewees are listed in the 
bibliography, they contribute only a limited amount to the overall understanding 
and come only from the republican paramilitary side. The recent Boston College 
tapes scandal, followed now by the collapse of a large research project on Dissident 
Irish Republicans being conducted by the University of Liverpool has clearly limited 
the number of available and willing interviewees for projects such as this – 
particularly when it concludes that, by the policy’s end, the vast majority of 
internees were far from innocent parties in the conflict. But this does less to explain 
the lack of interviews with retired officials, soldiers and police from whom a wealth 
of information  particularly in relation to the localities McCleary is so interested in 
exploring and what might have been gleaned would have added significantly to the 
research already conducted.  
This work’s greatest contribution however lies in the way the evidence it provides 
substantiates the ideas that some liberal researchers of terrorism (and counter-
terrorism) have put forward. In particular, this work supports a number of 
arguments in Richard English’s Terrorism: How to Respond (2009) and in Louise 
Richardson, What Terrorists Want: understanding the enemy, containing the threat 
(2007). This book charts the course and impact of a Counter Terrorism policy that 
in virtually every measurable respect failed, not because it had to, but because it 
was poorly timed, unevenly applied, led by weak intelligence, and undermined by a 
more convincing counter-narrative provided by opposition propagandists. As a 
result, this original work will be of interest to scholars and practitioners of Counter 
Insurgency and Counter Terrorism, along with those concerned with Irish history 
and debates surrounding the emergence of the Troubles in Northern Ireland.   
